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SECURITIES LEGISLATION-LIMITATIONS UPON THE SCOPE OF RULE X-lOB-5 
-A syndicate attempted to acquire all of the outstanding stock in a bridge 
corporation pursuant to a plan to transfer the stock to a bridge commission 
and realize substantial returns. The price offered for the stock was well 
over the market price but the resale plan was not disclosed. After control 
of 80 percent of the stock was obtained, the syndicate's purchasing agents 
were installed as officers and directors. They continued to purchase the 
stock without revealing the plan and the anticipated profits.1 Upon the 
completion of the plan, former stockholders in the corporation brought a 
class action against the syndicate members alleging a violation of rule 
X-lOB-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission because of the failure 
of the defendants to disclose the intention to resell. On defendants' motion 
for summary judgment, held, motion granted. The scheme was conceived 
and prosecuted by outsiders upon whom there was no duty of disclosure. 
Further, no such duty arose when defendants achieved control of the 
corporation since they gained no new information by virtue of achieving 
this position. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1955) 133 F. Supp. 753. 
Rule X-l0B-5, formulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1942, prohibits fraud by any person in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.2 This broad language, coupled with the possibility of 
1 The complicated transaction is described at length in Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol 
Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A. (2d) 201 (1952). 
2 SEC Release No. 3230, 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Serv. 1125,375 (1942): "It shall be unlawful 
for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
" (2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact _or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or 
" (3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security." 
The rule was promulgated pursuant to §10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934. 48 Stat. L. 891, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §78 (j). 
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civil recovery,3 has provoked a great deal of litigation in recent years.4 
By reading limitations into the rule, however, the courts have considerably 
narrowed its potential scope. For example, the more remote implications 
are eliminated by requiring "a semblance of privity" between the parties.5 
Although this limitation has been severely criticized as unwarranted by 
authority,6 inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts,7 and 
unfortunate because of the archaic and ambiguous nature of the term 
"privity,"8 it appears to be firmly established.9 However, it is unlikely 
that strict privity of contract is necessary. Reliance upon a misrepresenta-
tion by a person whom the defendant intended to mislead should be 
sufficient to create liability.10 In any event, the requirement cannot be 
found in the language of the rule. The most troublesome area covered 
by rule X-IOB-5 is that of non-disclosure of pertinent information by 
corporate "insiders."11 The leading case holds that it is unlawful for an 
insider to purchase stock without disclosing material facts affecting its 
value known to him by virtue of his inside position.12 In the principal 
case, the court draws negative inferences from this statement and uses it 
to set the boundaries of recovery. Thus, only insiders are under a duty 
to disclose and the information must be gained by virtue of their inside 
position. This dubious reasoning does violence to the rule in that it makes 
it applicable to far fewer persons than the phrase "any person" indicates.13 
Nevertheless, the considerations behind this result are highly practical. 
Realizing the speculative nature of stock transactions and the necessary 
differences of opinion between buyer and seller, the principal case allows 
interference only where the parties are not at arm's length, i.e., where 
s The leading case recognizing such recovery is Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 
(D.C. Pa. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 512 (motion to dismiss), (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 798 (on 
the merits), (D.C. Pa. 1947) 83 F. Supp. 613 (requests for additional findings). See 14 
UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 471 (1947). The implications of the Kardon case are analyzed in Loss, 
SECURITIES REGULATION 1052 (1951). 
4 See, generally, 59 YALE L. J. 1120 (1950). 
5 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 701 
at 706, alfd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 883. 
6 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Frank in the court of appeals decision in Joseph 
v. Farnsworth Radio and Television Corp., note 5 supra. See also 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 
(1952). 
7 See 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 at 311 (1952); 32 TEX. L. REv. 197 at 207 (1953). The ques-
tion is also discussed in Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1064, n. 404 (1951; Supp. 1955). 
s See Latty, "The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a Close Corpora-
tion under the S.E.C. Statutes," 18 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 505 at 520 (1953). 
9 See Donovan Inc. v. Taylor, (D.C. Cal. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 552, for a recent decision 
recognizing the privity requirement. 
10 To this effect, see Latty, "The Aggrieved Buyer or Seller or Holder of Shares in a 
Close Corporation under the S.E.C. Statutes,'' 18 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 505 at 520 (1953). 
11 See Loss, SECURmES REGULATION 824 (1951). There has been much comment on this 
question. See e.g.: 39 CALIF. L. REv. 429 (1951); 40 MINN. L. REv. 62 (1955). 
12 Speed v. Transamerica Corp., (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 808. For a history of the 
Transamerica litigation, see 54 MICH. L. REv. 971 (1956). 
13 See 44 Iu.. L. REv. 841 (1949), for a discussion of the meaning of "any person." 
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there is an unfair advantage taken by one because of his access to informa-
tion.14 The necessity for such a strained interpretation results from the 
sweeping, all-inclusive language of rule X-IOB-5. The principal case 
illustrates a process by which the rule is being cut down to manageable 
proportions. Liability is still recognized in cases containing traditional 
elements such as privity or fiduciary relationship. To extend it beyond 
those limits, a more precise statement than rule X-IOB-5 will be necessary. 
Cyril Moscow 
14 Principal case at 764. 
